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Abstract
In this paper, I compare the feasibility and the pro￿tability of group
vs. individual performance pay when workers are envious and when
veri￿able signals on the workers￿performances are not available. The
group bonus contract is superior as long as the principal faces no cred-
ibility problem. This is due to the fact that group performance pay
avoids the occurrence of inequity. However, the relational individ-
ual bonus contract may become dominant although it introduces the
prospect of unequal pay. The reason is that precisely the worker￿ s dis-
taste for wage inequity may actually soften the principal￿ s credibility
constraint.
Keywords: principal-agent, relational contract, inequity aversion,
bonus, envy
JEL classi￿cation: D63, D82, M52, M54
￿I would like to thank Dominique Demougin, Julia Schmid, Dorothee Schneider, and
Anja Sch￿ttner for helpful comments and discussions. Financial support by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk" is gratefully acknowl-
edged.
ySchool of Business and Economics, Spandauer Str. 1, D-10099 Berlin, Germany,
phone: +49 30 2093-1344, fax: +49 30 2093-1343, e-mail: kragl@wiwi.hu-berlin.de
11 Introduction
The present paper investigates how agents￿concerns for fairness a⁄ect the
optimal provision of incentives in a moral-hazard framework with only sub-
jective performance measures and inequity aversion. The existing literature
on incentive schemes under inequity aversion has mainly analyzed explicit
contracting. In these environments, employing inequity averse agents comes
at a cost for the principal (e.g. Bartling and Siemens (2007), Grund and
Sliwka (2005)). A notable exception is the analysis by Kragl and Schmid
(2006) which examines a framework where only subjective performances are
available in an in￿nitely repeated game. The analysis shows that in contrast
to the situation with objective performance measures, employing inequity
averse agents under individual performance compensation may be advanta-
geous to the principal. In the present paper, I introduce in a similar frame-
work the possibility of group compensation, and compare the advantage of
such a contract with the individual bonus scheme.
Whenever a ￿rm cannot directly observe the agent￿ s e⁄ort and there are
no perfect (deterministic) performance measures available, a moral-hazard
situation arises. In such an environment, incentive contracts on the basis
of performance assessments are used to better align the agents￿incentives
with the principal￿ s objective. However, for a third party it is often di¢ cult
or even impossible to assess an agent￿ s true contribution to ￿rm value.1 In
many cases, however, this contribution can be observed by both contract-
ing parties. The observed subjective performance may be used in implicit
agreements (relational contracts). As subjective assessments are not veri￿-
able by third parties, contracts are not court-enforceable and, thus, have to
be self-enforcing. They may be implemented in long-term relationships as
reputational equilibria.2 As employment contracts are usually long-term and
employer and workers thus interact repeatedly, relational contracts exhibit
realisitic features of actual incentive schemes.
1See e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and Holmstr￿m and Milgrom (1994).
2Reputational equilibria may exist if one party cares about her reputation in future
relationships. See e.g. Holmstr￿m (1981), Bull (1987), Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy
(1994), or Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002).
2Moreover, individual employment relationships are typically embedded
in the larger framework of the ￿rm, thus in a social context where individual
comparison may play a role. Experimental evidence suggests that workers
do not only care about absolute but also about relative payo⁄s.3 Hence, the
employer must take into account that her decisions regarding one worker
might a⁄ect other employment relationships within the same organization.
When agents are inequity averse, i.e. when they resent being paid more or
less than their co-workers, the prospect of unequal pay implies additional
agency costs for the principal, the so-called inequity premium.4 These costs
arise whenever the agents face a positive probability of receiving unequal
wages. With imperfect performance measures and individual performance
pay this is the case.
A remedy for problems related to inequity aversion is the implementa-
tion of joint-performance evaluation such as a group compensation scheme.
Eventhough there are no complementarities in production, the principal may
choose to pay a group bonus, solely for the purpose of avoiding inequity in
payo⁄s. Assuming inequity averse preferences on the agents￿sides, I investi-
gate the feasibility and pro￿tability of relational group bonus contracts and
compare the results to the case of relational individual bonus contracts as
investigated by Kragl and Schmid (2006).
In the existing literature it is frequently assumed that concerns for eq-
uity or fairness could serve as an explanation for observed wage compres-
sions or the absence of individual performance pay.5 Demougin and Fluet
(2006) show, "to the contrary, that ￿rms may favor reward systems with the
prospect of unequal pay precisely because of the workers￿distaste for wage
inequality"6 when workers are ￿nancially constrained.
Relational contracts under symmetric information have substantially
been analyzed by e.g. Bull (1987), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), and
3For experimental evidence of other-regarding preferences see e.g. Goranson and
Berkowitz (1966), Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1998), and Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe
(1995).
4This might not be true, when workers earn rents (Demougin and Fluet (2003), De-
mougin and Fluet (2006)). However, as I assume unlimited liability workers will earn no
rents in my setup.
5See e.g. Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988).
6Demougin and Fluet (2006), p. 39.
3Levin (2002). Besides there is an evolving literature analyzing self-enforcing
contracts under asymmetric information, in particular moral hazard in ef-
fort, e.g. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994, 2002), Levin (2003), Kvalły
and Olsen (2006), and Sch￿ttner (2007). I contribute to the latter strand
of literature by analyzing fairness concerns that may arise in multilateral
relational contracting under ex-post asymmetric information.
Kragl and Schmid (2006) consider an incentive scheme based upon in-
dividual performance in an otherwise identical setup. They show that, de-
pending on the principal￿ s discount rate, inequity aversion may enhance the
pro￿tability and feasibility of relational contracts. The present paper com-
plements the latter by introducing the possibility of group performance pay.
In particular, I analyze an in￿nitely repeated game with one ￿rm and
two workers. Workers are risk neutral and not ￿nancially constrained, but
they exhibit horizontal disadvantageous inequity aversion. They are con-
signed to work on a similar task. Typically such workers tend to compare
their payo⁄s with those of their colleagues.7 Following Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), I model preferences as ￿ self-centered inequity aversion￿and focus on
envy as the more severe emotion in this setup.8 The principal cannot ob-
serve either agent￿ s e⁄ort. She observes, however, an imperfectly correlated
non-veri￿able performance measure for each agent. To mitigate the moral
hazard problem she o⁄ers the agents an incentive contract contingent upon
individual or joint performance. As observed performances are not veri￿-
able, contracts have to be self-enforcing, i.e. reputation concerns have to
restrain the principal from deviating from the incentive contracts.9 Speci￿-
cally, credibility requires the principal￿ s gains from reneging (the bonus) to
fall short of the discounted gains from continuing the relational contract.
I show that the group bonus contract and the individual bonus con-
tract are equally pro￿table when the principal￿ s credibility constraint is
7For the importance of reference groups, see e.g. Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazer-
man (1989).
8For alternative speci￿cations regarding the formalization of fairness concerns see e.g.
Rabin (1993), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006). Moreover,
it is worth pointing out that incorporating empathy in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) would not a⁄ect my qualitative results.
9To guarantee self-enforcement of the relational contracts, I model the repeated-game
structure following Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994).
4non-binding10 and agents are not envious; both implement ￿rst-best e⁄orts.
Once agents are envious, the group bonus contract dominates the individual
bonus contract as long as the principal faces no credibility problem. This is
due the fact that, by adopting a group bonus structure, the principal does
not incur any expenses for inequity premiums while expected pro￿ts are
equal under both payment schemes.
However, once the credibility constraint takes e⁄ect, the group bonus
scheme is less e¢ cient than the individual bonus scheme if agents are not en-
vious. Implementing an arbitrary e⁄ort level requires a group bonus higher
than the respective individual bonus. This results from the weaker rela-
tionship between individual e⁄ort and the marginal likelihood of obtaining
the bonus in the group scheme. Thus for a range of low discount rates, the
group scheme is less pro￿table than the individual bonus scheme. Moreover,
relational contracts are then less likely to be feasible in the group scheme.
When agents are envious, implementing an arbitrary e⁄ort level necessi-
tates an even higher group bonus. The principal does not bene￿t from the
incentive-strenghtening e⁄ect of envy which allows for lowering the bonus
level under individual performance pay.11 This again makes the feasibil-
ity of relational contracts less likely. On the other hand, the group bonus
contract yields relatively higher long-run pro￿ts as it avoids inequity pre-
mium costs. This in turn facilitates credible commitment on the principal￿ s
side and thus makes relational contracts more likely to be implementable.
Hence, regarding the principal￿ s credibility, there is therefore a trade-o⁄ be-
tween the dissatisfaction associated with the prospect of unequal pay and
the incentives it generates.12
I ￿nd that, for a range of low propensities for envy, the relational individ-
ual bonus contract is clearly more e¢ cient than the group bonus contract.
Moreover, when agents are envious, the principal favors the individual bonus
contract to the group bonus contract whenever introducing the prospect of
unequal pay softens her credibility constraint. This is the case when a large
10This is the case whenever performance is veri￿able or, with non-veri￿able performance,
as long as the principal￿ s discount rate is su¢ ciently high.
11See Bartling and Siemens (2007), Grund and Sliwka (2005), Demougin and Fluet
(2006), and Kragl and Schmid (2006) for the motivating e⁄ect of envy.
12For an equivalent result in the case of veri￿able performance see Demougin and Fluet
(2006).
5incentive e⁄ect overcompensates the agency cost e⁄ect due to inequity pre-
mium payments. For a given level of envy, the relational individual bonus
contract is then more pro￿table than the group bonus contract for a cer-
tain range of discount rates. Moreover, for su¢ ciently low discount rates,
the group contract is yet infeasible when the individual bonus contract still
yields positive pro￿ts.
The next section describes the basic framework. Section 3 addresses the
agency problem in the single-period game. Section 4 develops the reputation
game and derives the optimal relational group contract. In this section, I
derive conditions for the superiority of either the group or the individual
compensation scheme by investigating the impact of envy on the equilibrium
contracts. Section 5 discusses the implications and concludes.
2 The Model
I consider a repeated game between a ￿rm and two workers homogeneous
in preferences and characteristics. Both agents exhibit inequity aversion,
as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In particular, I assume them
to only su⁄er from horizontal disadvantageous inequity, i.e. they dislike
outcomes where they are worse o⁄ than the respective other agent. Each
agent observes the other agent￿ s gross monetary payo⁄ ￿i. All parties are
risk neutral and not ￿nancially constrained or limitedly liable.13 Agent i￿ s
utility of payo⁄ ￿i (i = 1;2) when his co-worker earns ￿j is given by
Ui (￿i;￿j) = ￿i ￿ c(ei) ￿ ￿maxf￿j ￿ ￿i;0g; ￿ ￿ 0; i = 1;2; i 6= j; (1)
where ￿ denotes his propensity for envy and c(ei) his cost of e⁄ort with
c(0) = 0; c0 (0) = 0; c0 (ei) > 0; and c00 (ei) ￿ 0. The third term thus
captures the disutility derived from being worse o⁄ than agent j.14
13For simplicity, the agents￿utilities are assumed to be linear in money.
14Abstracting from costs, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose the following utility func-
tion: Ui = ￿i ￿ ￿maxf￿j ￿ ￿i;0g ￿ ￿ maxf￿i ￿ ￿j;0g; ￿ > ￿ > 0: Incorporating em-
pathy via the parameter ￿ would not qualitatively a⁄ect my results. Incorporating a
￿ < 0 re￿ ecting preferences for status or pride would even strengthen my results. More-
over, Demougin and Fluet (2006) take costs into account when investigating inequity:
Ui = ￿i ￿ c(ei) ￿ ￿maxf￿j ￿ c(ej) ￿ ￿i + c(ei);0g. This would also not change my
results. However, an inconvenient discontinuity at the symmetric Nash-equilibrium would
be introduced.
6In each period, each agent chooses an unobservable e⁄ort level ei that
stochastically determines his non-veri￿able contribution to ￿rm value Yi.
This contribution is either high or low; Yi 2 f0;1g. As Yi is observable by
all contracting parties, a repeated-game structure allows for its application
as a performance measure in a self-enforcing relational contract. By exerting
e⁄ort agent i a⁄ects the probability of a high contribution:
Pr[Yi = 1jei] = p(ei); (2)
where p(ei) 2 [0;1); p(0) = 0; p0 (ei) > 0; and p00 (ei) < 0. The realized
contributions of the two workers are stochastically independent events.
The principal￿ s one-period pro￿t per agent is an agent￿ s contribution to
￿rm value net of wage costs:
V = Yi ￿ ￿i; i = 1;2; i 6= j: (3)
Compensation contracts may be contingent on individual or joint per-
formance. In this kind of environment an optimal compensation contract is
linear and consists of a ￿xed wage wb and a bonus announced to be paid if
a favorable signal is detected. In the individual bonus scheme, the principal
promises to pay a bonus b to an agent whenever his individual contribution
to ￿rm value in the respective period is favorable (Yi = 1):
Agent 1;2 Y2 = 0 Y2 = 1
Y1 = 0 0;0 0;b
Y1 = 1 b;0 b;b
Thus, the agent￿ s gross monetary payo⁄ under an individual bonus con-
tract is
￿i = wb + bYi: (4)
In the group scheme, the principal o⁄ers each agent an identical com-
pensation contract
￿
wB;BYiYj
￿
; where wB is a guaranteed ￿xed wage and
BYiYj a (per-worker) group bonus which is paid contingent upon both agents￿
performances Yi and Yj in the respective period. Depending on the signals￿
realizations, the group incentive scheme allows for the implementation of
7the following bonus payments:
Agent 1;2 Y2 = 0 Y2 = 1
Y1 = 0 0;0 B01;B01
Y1 = 1 B10;B10 B11;B11
Hence, agent 1￿ s gross monetary payo⁄ under a group bonus contract is
(for agent 2 accordingly)
￿1 = wB + B11Y1Y2 + B10Y1 (1 ￿ Y2) + B01 (1 ￿ Y1)Y2: (5)
The timing of events within each period is as follows. At the beginning
of the period, the principal o⁄ers each agent one of the the above speci￿ed
compensation contracts. Second, the agents either accept the contract or
reject it in favor of an alternative employment opportunity that provides
utility U0. Third, if the agents accept the contract, agents simultaneously
choose respective e⁄ort levels ei. Fourth, Yi and Yj are realized and ob-
served by all parties. Finally, the agents receive the explicit ￿xed wage, and
if favorable signals are realized, the principal decides whether to pay the
implicit bonuses or not.
3 The Contracts under Veri￿able Performance
Before deriving the relational contract, I initially consider the single-period
game where individual performance is objectively assessable by assumption
such that there is no credibility problem on the principal￿ s side.15 After a
brief introduction of the individual bonus scheme analyzed by Kragl and
Schmid (2006) I derive the group bonus contracts and conclude with a com-
parison of both schemes.
3.1 The Individual Bonus Scheme Revisited
Provided that the incentive contracts base upon individual performance,
from the point of view of an agent, disadvantageous inequity occurs when
15Alternatively, one could assume the principal to have a su¢ ciently high discount rate
in order to guarantee a non-binding credibility constraint.
8only the other agent obtains a bonus. Thus, given that agent j exerts e⁄ort
ej, agent i￿ s expected utility is
E[Uijei;ej] = wb + p(ei)b ￿ c(ei) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p(ei))p(ej)b; (6)
i;j = 1;2; ￿ ￿ 0:
There is a unique symmetric Nash-equilibrium where agents exert identical
e⁄ort levels; ei = ej = e:16 The shape of p(e) and c(e) imply a concave
payo⁄ function for the agents such that e⁄ort follows from the ￿rst-order
condition of (6):
p0 (e)b ￿ c0 (e) + ￿p0 (e)p(e)b = 0 (7)
In the one-shot game, the principal￿ s sets wb;e to maximize expected
pro￿ts per agent subject to participation and incentive compatibility con-
straints:
max
wb;e (1 ￿ b(e;￿))p(e) ￿ wb
s.t.
(IC) b(e;￿) =
c0 (e)
(1 + ￿p(e))p0 (e)
(PC) wb + p(e)b ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p(e))p(e)b ￿ c(e) + U0;
(I)
where (IC) follows from (7) and constitutes the bonus b which the principal
has to o⁄er if she wants to induce e⁄ort e, given that the agents exhibit
disadvantageous inequity aversion ￿: Due to the assumption of unlimited
liability the participation constraint is binding, leading to zero rent for the
agents in the optimal contract. Substituting wb and b in the principal￿ s
objective function by using (IC) and (PC), her problem simpli￿es to
max
e
Vb (e;￿) = p(e) ￿ c(e) ￿ ￿p(e)(1 ￿ p(e))
c0 (e)
(1 + ￿p(e))p0 (e)
￿ U0: (8)
The following two propositions summarize the results regarding the agency
costs associated with envy derived by Kragl and Schmid (2006).
Proposition 1 Suppose that performance is veri￿able. Then under the in-
dividual bonus scheme, with an increasing propensity for envy, the agents
exert more e⁄ort for any given bonus.
16For the derivation of all results in this subsection see Kragl and Schmid (2006).
9Proof. See Kragl and Schmid (2006), proof of Proposition 1.
Intuitively, as envious agents su⁄er from being worse o⁄ than their co-
workers to a larger extent than standard agents, they exert relatively higher
levels of e⁄ort in order to decrease the probability of not getting the bonus.
This incentive-strengthening e⁄ect is in line with the agency literature.17 In
the remainder of the paper, I will refer to it as the incentive e⁄ect.
Proposition 2 Suppose that performance is veri￿able. Then under the in-
dividual bonus scheme,
(i) the ￿rst-best solution is obtained if agents are not envious, ￿ = 0.
(ii) the ￿rst-best solution can never be obtained if agents exhibit a propensity
for envy, ￿ > 0.
(iii) for any given e⁄ort level, total agency costs increase as agents become
more envious.
Proof. As for the ￿rst part of the claim (i), observe that with ￿ = 0, the
principal￿ s objective function (8) is
Vb (e;0) = p(e) ￿ c(e) ￿ U0: (9)
Optimization with respect to e⁄ort requires marginal productivity to equal
marginal costs of e⁄ort such that the ￿rst-best e⁄ort level e = eFB is imple-
mented. To prove (ii), with ￿ > 0, for an arbitrary e⁄ort level the di⁄erence
of (9) and (8) is negative as 0 ￿ p(e) < 1, c0 (e) > 0; and p0(e) > 0. Hence,
pro￿ts can only fall below ￿rst-best pro￿ts. For a formal proof of (iii) see
Kragl and Schmid (2006), proof of Proposition 2.
Despite the incentive e⁄ect the principal faces higher costs when agents
are envious; her pro￿t decreases as agents become more envious. This result
is due to the fact that the principal needs to compensate the agents for
the expected disutility from inequity in order to ensure participation. This
compensation is known as inequity premium. In the present problem, it is
given by the third term in the principal￿ s objective function (8). I will refer
to this wage cost-augmenting e⁄ect as inequity premium e⁄ect. Again, this
17See e.g. Demougin and Fluet (2006). In the context of tournaments, Grund and
Sliwka (2005) and Demougin and Fluet (2003) report the same result. Kr￿kel (2007)
identi￿es an incentive-strenghthening e⁄ect when emotions play a role in tournaments.
10result is in line with the agency literature, see e.g. Bartling and Siemens
(2007) and Grund and Sliwka (2005).
3.2 The Group Bonus Scheme
In the group scheme, when exerting e⁄ort ei while his co-worker exerts e⁄ort
ej agent i￿ s expected utility (i = 1;2;i 6= j) is
E[Uijei;ej] = wB + p(ei)(1 ￿ p(ej))B10 + p(ej)(1 ￿ p(ei))B01(10)
+p(ei)p(ej)B11 ￿ c(ei):
For ease of notation, let ￿ = B11 ￿ B10 ￿ B01. Then reformulation yields
E[Uijei;ej] = wB + p(ei)B10 + p(ej)B01 + p(ei)p(ej)￿: (11)
Note that whenever paid out, the group bonus is paid to both agents such
that inequity in payo⁄s can never occur. Hence, the agents￿inequity-averse
preference structure has no e⁄ect on their utilities in the group scheme. The
￿rst-order condition yields for agent 1 (for agent 2 accordingly)
p0 (e1)B10 + p0 (e1)p(e2)￿ = c0 (e1): (IC)
In the one-shot game, the principal sets B10;B01;B11;wB;e1;e2 to maximize
expected pro￿ts:
max
B10;B01;￿;wB;e1;e2
p(e1) + p(e2) ￿ 2p(e1)B10 ￿ 2p(e2)B01
￿2p(e1)p(e2)￿ ￿ 2wB
s.t.
(IC1) p0 (e1)B10 + p0 (e1)p(e2)￿ = c0 (e1)
(IC2) p0 (e2)B01 + p0 (e2)p(e1)￿ = c0 (e2)
(PC1)
wB + p(e1)B10 + p(e2)B01 + p(e1)p(e2)￿
￿ c(e1) + U0
(PC2)
wB + p(e2)B01 + p(e1)B10 + p(e1)p(e2)￿
￿ c(e2) + U0
(II)
where (PC1) and (PC2) ensure participation and (IC1) and (IC2) incentive
compatibility, respectively. Due to the assumption of unlimited liability,
11the participation constraint is binding leading to zero rent for the agents in
the optimal contract. Substituting B10;B01;B11 and wB in the principal￿ s
objective function by using (PC1) and (PC2), her problem simpli￿es to
max
B01;B10;￿;e1;e2
p(e1) + p(e2) ￿ c(e1) ￿ c(e2) ￿ 2U0 (12)
s.t. (IC1),(IC2).
By the incentive-compatibility constraints, the principal can implement any
e⁄ort level by an appropriate choice of the bonuses fB10;B01;B11g. Thus,
we can neglect the incentive-compatibility constraints. Then from the ￿rst-
order condition of the principal￿ s objective function it follows that, at the
optimum, marginal productivity equals marginal costs such that ￿rst-best
e⁄ort levels e1 = e2 = eFB are implemented:
p0(eFB) = c0 ￿
eFB￿
(13)
Proposition 3 Suppose that performance is veri￿able. Then the ￿rst-best
solution is obtained for any group bonus scheme fB10;B01;B11g that satis￿es
(IC1) and (IC2) for e1 = e2 = eFB, regardless of the agents￿propensity for
envy ￿.
Given that the principal implements ￿rst-best e⁄ort levels, an optimal
group bonus scheme can be characterized more exactly.
Proposition 4 In the group bonus scheme, the principal optimally sets
B10 = B01 =: B.
Proof. This result directly follows from the agents￿incentive compatibil-
ity constraints. In order to implement ￿rst-best e⁄ort levels, the principal
chooses the bonuses B10;B01; and B11 such that (IC1) and (IC2) implement
e1 = e2 = eFB. If e1 = e2, then c0 (e1) = c0 (e2): Consequently, (IC1) and
(IC2) imply p0 (e1)B10 + p0 (e1)p(e2)￿ = p0 (e2)B01 + p0 (e2)p(e1)￿: As
e1 = e2 further implies p0 (e1) = p0 (e2) and p(e1) = p(e2), it must hold that
B10 = B01.
12Provided e1 = e2 = eFB and B10 = B01 =: B, due to the separability of
the pro￿t function across workers the principal￿ s objective further simpli￿es:
max
e;B;￿
p(e) ￿ c(e) ￿ U0 (14)
s.t. p0 (e)B + p0 (e)p(e)￿ = c0 (e)
3.3 Comparison of the Bonus Schemes
Proposition 2 and 3 allow for a comparison of the e¢ ciency of the group and
the individual scheme in the stage game.
Proposition 5 Suppose that performance is veri￿able.
(i) When agents are not envious, ￿ = 0, both the individual and the group
bonus scheme lead to identical (￿rst-best) pro￿ts for the principal.
(ii) In contrast, when workers are envious, ￿ > 0, the principal favors the
group scheme over the individual scheme as only the former yields the ￿rst-
best solution.
Assuming no credibility problem on the principal￿ s side, employing in-
dividual bonuses comes at a cost for the principal if agents exhibit inequity
aversion. However, introducing group bonuses resolves the problem. The
group scheme involves no distortions with respect to the agents￿e⁄ort de-
cisions as inequity does not occur. Hence, the incentive scheme is e¢ cient.
This equally holds for the individual bonus scheme as long as workers are
not envious. In contrast, when agents exhibit envy, the prospect of unequal
pay distorts the agents￿e⁄ort decisions in the individual bonus scheme. Due
to the inequity premium payments, the principal never implements ￿rst-best
e⁄ort levels. The more envious the agents are, the higher are the respective
inequity premium costs as the expected disutilities from inequity increase
likewise.
4 The Relational Contracts
In the following, I analyze the moral hazard problem under non-veri￿able
performance. I intitially derive the principal￿ s credibility constraints for both
13incentive schemes. Then I characterize the optimal group contract in the
repeated game. After that I compare the results to the individual relational
bonus contract analyzed by Kragl and Schmid (2006). An analysis of the
pro￿tability and feasibilty of both types of contract allows me to investigate
which payment scheme is desirable from the ￿rm￿ s point of view provided
that agents are envious and performance is non-veri￿able.
4.1 The Credibility Constraints
To model the relational contract, I embed the foregoing stage game into an
in￿nitely repeated game between the ￿rm and each agent, considering trigger
strategy equilibria. If the principal reneges on the promised bonus once, no
agent will ever again believe her to ful￿ll the contract as the information on
a principal￿ s deviation from the relational contract is rapidly transmitted
to the labor market.18 Hence, the principal￿ s reputation is decisive for her
ability to implement relational contracts.
As e⁄ort is not observable, agents will exert zero e⁄ort if relational con-
tracts are infeasible, corresponding to a closure of the ￿rm and resulting in
a fallback pro￿t of zero. If relational contracts are feasible, the principal
realizes a continuation pro￿t from each long-term relationship correspond-
ing to respective expected one-period pro￿ts. For the relational contract to
be self-enforcing, the gains from reneging must fall short of the gains from
continuing the relational contract. Thus, in the group scheme, the ￿rm is
credible if and only if
max
Yi;Yj
fBYiYj (e)g ￿
VB (e)
r
; (CCB)
where VB (e) = p(e) ￿ c(e) ￿ U0 is the ￿rm￿ s continuation pro￿t and r is
the ￿rm￿ s interest rate.19 By contrast, in the individual bonus scheme, for
18As Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) note, each agent in the employment relation-
ship could alternatively be represented by an in￿nite sequence of agents, each of whom
lives for one period, provided that each period￿ s agent learns the history of play before
the period begins. See also Bull (1987) for the role of reputation in implicit contracts.
19The principal￿ s rationality constraint follows Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994).
Note that the interest rate r may be translated into the ￿rm￿ s discount rate referring
to e.g. its patience. Then r = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿): Hart (2001) emphasizes the discount rate￿ s
interpretation as a measure for dependency or trust between the transacting parties. Al-
ternatively, r can be reinterpreted so that the game is not in￿nitely repeated but instead,
14the contracts to be self-enforcing the following condition must hold:20
b(e;￿) ￿
Vb (e;￿)
r
(CCb)
(CCB) and (CCb) will be referred to as the principal￿ s repective credibility
constraints. Note that in the individual scheme credibility depends on the
agents￿propensity for envy.
4.2 The Optimal Group Bonus Scheme
As Proposition 3 states there are many combinations of bonuses fB;B11g
satisfying (12) and hence implementing ￿rst-best e⁄orts, as long as the prin-
cipal is credible. However, suppose r is such that the principal is no longer
credible for a given bonus BYiYj
￿
eFB￿
. Since wB can always be chosen such
that agents earn no rents, pro￿ts in the group scheme are not a⁄ected by the
size of the bonus. However, the size of the group bonus directly a⁄ects the
left-hand side of (CCB). A smaller absolute bonus payment to each agent
softens the constraint, i.e. the principal is able to commit not to deviate
from the incentive contract for larger values of r. From this cognition I can
deduce the optimal group payment scheme when credibility plays a role.
Proposition 6 Suppose that performance is non-veri￿able. Then, for im-
plementing a given e⁄ort level e under group performance pay, one of two
speci￿c bonus schemes fB;B11g is optimal. Depending on the size of p(e),
the principal optimally sets
B = B11 =
c0 (e)
(1 ￿ p(e))p0 (e)
if p(e) ￿ 1
2;
B = 0 ^ B11 =
c0 (e)
p(e)p0 (e)
otherwise:
Proof. With B10 = B01 =: B, the incentive-compatibility constraint is for
each agent given by
p0 (e)B + p0 (e)p(e)(B11 ￿ 2B) = c0 (e): (15)
in each period, the probability that the principal-agent relationship will be repeated in
the following period is exogenously given by a parameter ￿: Then r = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿).
20See Kragl and Schmid (2006), subsection 2.2.
15Reformulation yields
(1 ￿ 2p(e))B + p(e)B11 =
c0 (e)
p0 (e)
: (16)
Applying the implicit-function theorem yields
dB11
dB
= ￿
1 ￿ 2p(e)
p(e)
:
Due to the credibility requirement, the principal minimizes the maximum
absolute bonus payment (B11;B) payable after the signals￿realizations. De-
pending on the value of p(e) we can distingiush two possible scenarios.
(i) First, assume p(e) < 1
2. Then dB11=dB < 0, and any increase in
B requires a reduction of B11 and vice versa. As a result, only B = B11
is optimal as it guarantees the smallest values for the maximum possible
bonus. For B = B11, (16) yields the incentive-compatible bonus level B for
any e⁄ort level e:
B (e) =
c0 (e)
(1 ￿ p(e))p0 (e)
(17)
(ii) Second, assume p(e) > 1
2. Then dB11=dB > 0, and any reduction
of B allows for a reduction in B11 and vice versa. Hence, the principal
optimally pays either B or B11.
For B11 = 0, (16) yields B (e) =
c0(e)
(1￿2p(e))p0(e). For any e and p(e) > 1
2
this expression becomes negative. There are two Nash equilibria of the
agents￿e⁄ort choices; e > 0 and e = 0. Among these, exerting no e⁄ort
is the focal equilibrium as it gives both a higher payo⁄.21 This, of course,
cannot be optimal for the principal. Hence the principal optimally sets
B = 0 and B11 > 0 and the agents exert positive e⁄ort.
For B = 0, (16) yields B11 (e) =
c0(e)
p(e)p0(e). For any e and p(e) > 1
2, this
expression is positive. Consequently, for p(e) > 1
2, the principal optimally
sets g = 0 and
B11 (e) =
c0 (e)
p(e)p0 (e)
: (18)
21For a proof of this argument see Appendix.
16The following tables illustrate the optimal group bonus schemes for
p(e) ? 1
2 according to the above proposition:
Optimal group scheme if p(e) < 1
2
Agent i;j Yj = 1 Yj = 1
Yi = 0 0;0 B;B
Yi = 1 B;B B;B
Optimal group scheme if p(e) > 1
2
Agent i;j Yj = 0 Yj = 1
Yi = 0 0;0 0;0
Yi = 1 0;0 B11;B11
4.3 Comparison of the Bonus Schemes
4.3.1 Comparison of Group and Individual Bonus
As Proposition 6 states, in equilibrium the principal o⁄ers the following
per-worker group bonus to induce e⁄ort level e:
if p(e) ￿ 1
2 : B11 (e) =
c0 (e)
p(e)p0 (e)
if Yi = Yj = 1
if p(e) > 1
2 : B (e) =
c0 (e)
(1 ￿ p(e))p0 (e)
if Yi = 1 _ Yj = 1
(19)
As derived above, in the individual scheme, to induce e⁄ort level e; the
required individual bonus depends on the agents￿propensity for envy and
is22
b(e;￿) =
c0 (e)
(1 + ￿p(e))p0 (e)
: (20)
Proposition 7 For any given e⁄ort level e, the size of the incentive-compatible
group bonus exceeds the size of the individual bonus b(e;￿). This di⁄erence
further increases as ￿ increases.
22See Kragl and Schmid (2006), subsection 2.1.
17Proof. Equations (19) and (20) yield the following relations:
B11 (e)
p(e)
1 + ￿p(e)
= b(e;￿) if p(e) ￿ 1
2
B (e)
1 ￿ p(e)
1 + ￿p(e)
= b(e;￿) otherwise:
As ￿ ￿ 0 and 0 ￿ p(e) < 1 it must hold that B11 (e) > b(e;￿) as well as
B (e) > b(e;￿): The second part of the Proposition follows from Proposition
1.
Intuitively, as the probability of obtaining the bonus is less responsive to
changes in e⁄ort in the case of a group bonus, the latter must be greater than
the individual bonus in order to induce an equivalent level of e⁄ort. Hence,
even for the case of standard agents (￿ = 0), it holds that B11 (e) > b(e); re-
spectively B (e) > b(e): Moreover, due to the incentive-strengthening e⁄ect
of envy identi￿ed above, the incentive-compatible individual bonus becomes
smaller the more envious the agents are whereas the group bonus remains
una⁄ected.
4.3.2 Comparison of the Pro￿tability of the Bonus Schemes
As long as the principal faces no credibility problem, the group bonus con-
tracts (weakly) dominate the individual bonus contracts. In this subsection,
I analyze whether this conclusion changes when credibility plays a role.
Speci￿cally, I study the e⁄ects of envy on the principal￿ s pro￿ts in the re-
peated game.
An optimal relational contract implements e to maximize the principal￿ s
expected pro￿t per period, subject to her credibility constraint. Hence, the
optimal pro￿t in the individual scheme is
V ￿
b (r;￿) =: max
e Vb (e;￿); s.t. b(e;￿) ￿ Vb (e;￿)=r: (21)
Accordingly, optimal pro￿t in the group scheme is given by
V ￿
B (r) =: max
e
VB (e); s.t. B￿ (e) ￿ VB (e)=r; (22)
18where B￿ (e) designates the optimal group bonus depending on the value of
p(e). Denote the interest rate where the principal￿ s credibility constraint
becomes binding for a given level of e⁄ort rB and rb in the group and the
individual scheme, respectively. The interest rates where the respective
relational contracts become infeasible denote rB and rb.
First consider the case of non-envious agents, ￿ = 0; and a ￿xed ef-
fort level e: Note that then VB (e) = Vb (e). Moreover, from the proof of
Proposition 7, we can derive that b(e) ￿ B￿ (e): These cognitions imply the
following result.
Proposition 8 Suppose that performance is non-veri￿able and agents are
not envious, ￿ = 0. Then the principal always (weakly) prefers the individ-
ual bonus contract to the group bonus contract.
r
V*b(r;a=0)
V*B(r)
rB rb rB rb
Figure 1: Pro￿ts under non-veri￿able performance for non-envious agents
in the individual and the group scheme.
Figure 1 sketches the result of Proposition 8. Observe that pro￿ts are
equal under both schemes as long as none of the credibility constraints is
binding. However, once the constraint becomes binding, ￿rst-best e⁄ort
levels are no longer implementable. Note that the credibility constraint be-
comes binding in the group scheme for a lower value of r as in the individual
scheme, rB < rb. As a result, for any interest rate r > rB, pro￿ts in the in-
dividual bonus scheme exceed pro￿ts in the group scheme as long as r ￿ rb.
Moreover, individual bonus contracts are feasible for a greater range of in-
19terest rates, rb > rB. Hence, when agents are not envious and credibility is
an issue, the principal clearly prefers the individual bonus scheme.
These observations have an immediate implication for the case of envious
agents. Proposition 8 implies that, for non-envious agents, there is a range of
interest rates rB < r ￿ rb such that the group bonus contract does no longer
implement ￿rst-best e⁄orts, whereas the individual bonus contract does.
Thus, by the continuity of the pro￿t function, introducing a small amount
of expected payo⁄ inequity cannot change the conclusion. The following
proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 9 Suppose that performance is non-veri￿able. Then there is
a range of values ￿ 2 [0;￿], where the individual bonus contract dominates
the group bonus contract.
For the case of envious agents, ￿ > 0, and a ￿xed e⁄ort level, the di⁄erent
e⁄ects of envy on the feasibility of relational contracts can be understood
by closer examination of the credibility conditions (CCB) and (CCb). From
Proposition 7 we know that the individual bonus contract b < B11;B: Hence
deviation is less attractive under the individual bonus scheme and credibility
is facilitated. In contrast, for a given level of e⁄ort e and ￿ > 0, VB (e) >
Vb (e;￿). Thus ful￿lling the relational contract is less attractive under the
individual bonus scheme and credibility is more di¢ cult. Hence, we observe
an ambiguous e⁄ect of envy on the credibility constraint.
Kragl and Schmid (2006) show that, in the individual bonus scheme,
the incentive e⁄ect may outweigh the inequity premium e⁄ect such that
the credibility constraint is softened as agents become more envious. They
provide a condition assuring that the principal￿ s incentive to renege on the
(relatively small) bonus payments is su¢ ciently low such that the negative
impact of envy on the continuation pro￿t is overbalanced. This result has
the following implication for a comparison of the individual bonus scheme
with the group scheme. De￿ne the minimum e⁄ort level implementable just
before the relational individual bonus contract becomes infeasible e = e:
Proposition 10 Suppose that performance is non-veri￿able. Then there is
a range of high interest rates r, where pro￿ts in the individual bonus contract,
20V ￿
b (r;￿), exceed pro￿ts in the group bonus contract, V ￿
B (r), if at e = e, the
following condition holds:
p >
(c + U0)p0 + c0
p0 + c0 (23)
Moreover, on condition (23) the range of interest rates r where V ￿
b (r;￿) > 0
and V ￿
B (r) = 0 increases as agents become more envious.
Proof. Denote rb (￿) the interest rate where a relational individual bonus
contract becomes infeasible for a given value of ￿: By Proposition 8, rb (0) >
rB: Kragl and Schmid (2006) show that on condition (23), rb (￿) increases
in ￿.23 Thus, on condition (23) it must also hold that rb (￿) ￿ rB increases
in ￿.
On condition (23) reputational equilibria can be sustained for a greater
range of interest rates under the individual bonus contract. Thus, there
exist cases, where the principal clearly favors the relational individual bonus
contract over the relational group bonus contract for a range of high interest
rates, precisely because of the agents￿distaste for wage inequality. Figure 2
illustrates this result.
r
V*b(r;a=0)
V*B(r)
rB rb(0) rB rb(0)
V*b(r;a>0)
rb(a>0) rb(a>0)
Figure 2: Pro￿ts under non-veri￿able performance in the individual and the
group scheme.
23See Kragl and Schmid (2006), proof of Proposition 3.
215 Concluding Remarks
In the existing literature it is commonly assumed that concerns for equity or
fairness could serve as an explanation for observed wage compressions or the
absence of individual performance pay. The present paper shows that this
prediction should be quali￿ed when performance measures are not veri￿able.
I investigate how agents￿concerns for fairness a⁄ect the optimal provi-
sion of incentives in a moral-hazard framework with only subjective perfor-
mance measures and inequity aversion. Speci￿cally, I compare group bonus
compensation with individual bonus compensation in an in￿nitely repeated
game of one principal and two agents.
I show that the group bonus contract yields higher pro￿ts than the in-
dividual bonus contract as long as the principal￿ s credibility constraint is
non-binding. This is due the fact that, by adopting a group bonus struc-
ture, the principal does not incur any expenses for inequity premiums while
contributions to ￿rm value are equal under both payment schemes.
However, the superiority of the group bonus scheme is no more unam-
biguous once the credibility constraint takes e⁄ect. For non-envious agents,
the conclusion is actually reversed. For envious agents, the prospect of un-
equal pay generates a trade-o⁄ between the individual scheme that exploits
the associated incentives and the group scheme that avoids associated in-
equity premium costs.
Credibility requires the principal￿ s gains from reneging (the group bonus)
to fall short of the discounted gains from continuing the relational contract.
Thus, a higher bonus level hinders credible commitment by the principal. In
this regard, two drawbacks of the group scheme become apparent. First, a
group bonus implies a weaker relationship between individual e⁄ort and the
marginal likelihood of obtaining the bonus. Hence, it must be larger than
the respective individual bonus for implementing a given level of e⁄ort. In
addition, the principal does not bene￿t from the incentive-strenghtening
e⁄ect of envy which allows for lowering the bonus level under individual
performance pay. This again requires raising the bonus level, making the
relational contract less likely. On the other hand, however, the group bonus
contract yields relatively higher long-run pro￿ts as it avoids agency costs
22associated with inequity. This in turn facilitates credible commitment on
the principal￿ s side and thus makes the relational contract more likely.
I ￿nd that, for a range of low propensities for envy, the relational individ-
ual bonus contract is clearly more e¢ cient than the group bonus contract.
Moreover, when agents are envious, the principal favors the individual bonus
contract to the group bonus contract whenever introducing the prospect of
unequal pay softens her credibility constraint. This is the case when a large
incentive e⁄ect overcompensates the agency cost e⁄ect due to inequity pre-
mium payments. For a given level of envy, the relational individual bonus
contract is then more pro￿table than the group bonus contract for a cer-
tain range of discount rates. Moreover, for su¢ ciently low discount rates,
the group contract is yet infeasible when the individual bonus contract still
yields positive pro￿ts.
Concluding, it is worth pointing out the following. When the principal
faces a credibility problem, instead of substituting the group bonus com-
pletely by an individual bonus she could alternatively introduce an indi-
vidual bonus in addition to the group bonus in order to lower the overall
bonus payment. This would, however, decrease overall bonus payments to
a smaller extent than a substitution of the individual bonus for the group
bonus. On the other hand, agency costs due to expected inequity would
be comparatively small. Therefore, concerning the principal￿ s credibility, I
expect a very similar trade-o⁄ between the incentive e⁄ect of envy and the
dissatisfaction associated with the prospect of unequal pay. The analysis of
such a contract is subject to future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 6 (ii) ctd. Assume p(e) > 1
2 and, for the imple-
mentation of any e, the principal o⁄ers a negative bonus B < 0 while setting
B11 = 0. Recall that an agent￿ s expected utility is given by
E[Uijei;ej] = wB + p(ei)(1 ￿ p(ej))B + p(ej)(1 ￿ p(ei))B ￿ c(ei): (24)
23The Nash-equilibrium is then symmetric and unique as shown in the follow-
ing. The respective ￿rst-order conditions of (24) are given by
p0 (ei)(1 ￿ 2p(ej))B = c0 (ei); (25)
p0 (ej)(1 ￿ 2p(ei))B = c0 (ej): (26)
Combining both equations implies
c0 (ei)
p0 (ei)(1 ￿ 2p(ej))
=
c0 (ej)
p0 (ej)(1 ￿ 2p(ei))
(27)
,
c0 (ei)(1 ￿ 2p(ei))
p0 (ei)
=
c0 (ej)(1 ￿ 2p(ej))
p0 (ej)
: (28)
Both sides of equation (28) represent a function of the agent￿ s e⁄ort level:
c0 (e)(1 ￿ 2p(e))
p0 (e)
(29)
Since (29) is monotonically increasing in e, equation (28) is satis￿ed if and
only if ei = ej = e. To see this, consider the derivative of (29) with respect
to e⁄ort:
p0 (e)((1 ￿ 2p(e))c00 (e) ￿ 2p0 (e)c0 (e)) ￿ p00 (e)c0 (e)(1 ￿ 2p(e))
p0 (e)
2 (30)
As p(e) > 0:5;p0 (e);c00 (e);c0 (e) > 0; and p00 < 0, (30) is strictly negative.
Moreover, as the interior solution maximizes the agents￿concave utility func-
tion (24), for e > 0, the equilibrium is also unique.
With e > 0, both agents face a positive probability of having to pay a bonus
and incur costs of e⁄ort. Thus, to ensure participation, the principal has to
o⁄er a strictly positive ￿xed wage wB. However, when being o⁄ered wB > 0,
exerting zero e⁄ort yields strictly higher expected utilities for both agents
than exerting positive e⁄ort. Thus, though e > 0 is an equilibrium, both
agents prefer the equilibrium with zero e⁄ort. The corner solution e = 0 is
hence the focal equilibrium.
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